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The basis for a judge's use of equity, or "justice administered according to
fairness as contrasted with strictly formulated rules of common law,"' has long
been the subject of heated debate in Anglo-American legal systems. A portion
of that debate was featured in a recent symposium of Law and Contemporary
Problems entitled "Modern Equity.",2 Professor Deborah DeMott framed the
controversy in the first sentence of that volume, remarking that "[e]quity,
however large its triumphs, has long been trailed by challenges to its legitima-
cy."'3 The articles that followed demonstrated a wide divergence of opinion
about the role of equity in Anglo-American law. Professor Laycock proclaimed
"the triumph of equity,"4 while Professor Rowe intimated that equity enjoys
only a tenuous existence in U.S. constitutional law. This note attempts to
carry forward the debate about the legitimacy of equity in Anglo-American law
by looking backward to equity's roots in Greek philosophy. The note maintains
that the dominant criticisms of equity miss the mark, largely because they fail
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to understand equity's fundamental role in a legal system that respects the rule
of law.
Of course, suspicion about the place of equity in Anglo-American law is not
surprising, given that Western legal systems since the time of Aristotle have
emphasized justice according to law rather than personal rule. A judge's
unfettered use of equity, if it were to entail ignoring established legal principles
in favor of wholly individualized case-by-case rulings, could destroy a system of
universally applicable rules. Consider John Selden's famous invective against
equity:
Equity is a roguish thing, for [in] law we have a measure [and] know what to trust too.
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger
or narrower so is equity. Tis ... as if they should make the standard for the measure
we call a foot, to be the Chancellors foot; what an uncertain measure this would be;
one Chancellor has a long foot another a short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis the
same thing in the Chancellors conscience.6
This note responds to the criticisms of equity by revisiting Aristotle's
conception of ttsicsta, which is usually translated as equity,7 as well as Roscoe
Pound's similar notions. A full explanation of Aristotle's and Pound's writings
demonstrates that a judge's use of equity is a necessary and stabilizing feature
of the application of universal laws to particular cases. As such, equity does not
invoke the mere vicissitudes of a judge's conscience; rather, equity accounts for
the particular facts of any given situation and applies general laws to a specific
case. Equity does not vary with the length of the Chancellor's foot. On the
contrary, as Aristotle recognized, equity is like the special lead ruler used in
Lesbian building that "is not fixed, but adapts itself to the shape of the stone."8
Indeed, like the flexible tape measure used by builders today, equity is not
without a standard, but instead conforms a universal standard to the contours
of the particular objects it encounters.
This note draws from both legal and philosophical sources, proceeding in
four parts. Part II presents a short, uncontroversial account of Aristotle's
concept of equity, followed by a sketch of the dominant interpretation of his
theory. Part III reviews the role of equity in Anglo-American law, ultimately
focusing on how equity came to be regarded as a doctrine to fill gaps in existing
laws. Part IV examines two predominant criticisms of equity: first, that equity
leads to arbitrary personal rule at the expense of justice according to laws and,
6. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927) (spelling and capitalization
modernized); see also H. Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The Chancellor's Conscience and
Constructive Trusts, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Summer 1993).
7. This note follows W.D. Ross and several earlier translators in rendering itnteiKctt as "equity."
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V, 1137a31 (W.D. Ross trans., 1925) [hereinafter ROSS
TRANSLATION]. Terence Irwin's recent edition of the Nicomachean Ethics translates the term as
"decency." See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 392 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985) [hereinafter
ETHICS]. "Decency" may be a more etymologically sound translation. However, given that Anglo-
American lawyers have consistently translated Aristotle's term lrttihcta as "equity" for the purpose
of informing their own views of equity, the former translation is used in this note.
8. ETHICS, supra note 7, at 1137b30-31. Except for the terms translated in notes 7 and 9, this note
utilizes Irwin's translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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second, that equity should disappear as a legal code expands. Part V, by
drawing on selected works of Roscoe Pound and by submitting a different
interpretation of Aristotle's writings, argues that Pound and Aristotle arrived
at a concept of equity that not only avoids the criticisms outlined earlier, but
also produces a coherent and justifiable role for equity in modern Anglo-
American law.
II
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF EQUITY
As part of the exposition of T6 &K Vov, or justice, in Book V of the Nico-
machean Ethics, Aristotle introduces the concept of tttziwsta, or equity. Part
II of this note presents a brief recapitulation of Aristotle's argument, followed
by a summary of the dominant interpretation of his theory. Since Aristotle's
discussion of equity also invokes the notions of v6jto;, or law, and p6v1cn;,
or practical intelligence,9 a minimal account of those concepts is also warranted.
A. An Overview of Aristotle's Account of Equity
Book V of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which dates from the fourth
century B.C., presents a puzzle regarding the relationship between equity and
justice. Aristotle begins by noting that we often praise both what is equitable
as well as the equitable person and even use the term "equitable" in place of
"good" to describe a person. 10 But given that we characterize justice as a
virtue, it is puzzling that we also call equity good. Aristotle proposes that if
what is equitable is different from what is just, both what is equitable and what
is just cannot be good. Alternatively, if both what is equitable and what is just
are good, they cannot be different: "For [apparently] either what is just is not
excellent or what is equitable is not excellent, if it is something other than what
is just, or else, if they are both excellent, they are the same."'" Aristotle
resolves this puzzle by insisting that both what is equitable and what is just are
good, "[f]or what is equitable is better than one way of being just .. ,,"2 That
is, being equitable is better than being legally just. Indeed, the puzzle only
arises because "what is equitable is just, but is not what is legally just, but a
rectification of it." 13
9. The translation of pp6vTlatq as practical intelligence combines the renderings of W.D. Ross and
Terence Irwin, who define the term as "practical wisdom" and "intelligence," respectively. See ROSS
TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at VI, 1140b4; ETHICS, supra note 7, at 411.
10. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137a34-1137b2. In this instance, translating tnteiici, as "decent"
actually would make Aristotle's meaning clearer to English readers: Aristotle is pointing out that
Greeks often call a "good" man a "decent" man.
11. Id. at 1137b4-5.
12. Id. at 1137b8-9.
13. Id- at 1137b11-13.
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The way in which equity may be viewed as a rectification of the legally just
centers on Aristotle's conception of law. He holds that all law is universal. 4
But sometimes, no universal rule can be formulated to account for all situations.
Hence, where a law must be enacted but cannot be drafted to cover all
situations, "the law chooses the [universal rule] that is usually [correct], well
aware of the error being made."'" Aristotle is quick to point out that this
error is not the fault of the law or the legislature. Rather, "the law is no less
correct on this account; for the source of the error is ... the nature of the
object itself, since that is what the subject-matter of actions is bound to be
like."16
Even if an error in the law is not the fault of the law itself or of the
legislature, the gravity of such an error is made apparent elsewhere in the
Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle indicates the enormous breadth of the
realm of the law under his theory. Since people yield to compulsion more
quickly than to argument, laws should deal generally with all aspects of life. 7
Indeed, to Aristotle, the law instructs people to perform actions expressing all
of the virtues and prohibits all vicious actions. 8 Moreover, Aristotle hints that
law occupies the entire field of justice, for "what is just will be both what is
lawful and what is fair, and what is unjust will be both what is lawless and what
is unfair."' 9 Clearly, for Aristotle, "law" has a more extensive reach than it
does in modern Western law, where positive law is often viewed as somehow
disassociated from morality.2
Yet Aristotle also recognizes that laws are often imperfect: A "correctly
established" law promotes virtues and discourages vices well, whereas "the less
carefully framed [law] does this worse."21 Equity is essential precisely because
of these imperfections in the law.22 Sometimes the universal rule of law is
inappropriate for a particular case, since a mechanical application of the
universal rule would violate the intended scope of the rule. In such a situation,
"the legislator falls short, and has made an error by making an unconditional
rule."'  Equity's role is to rectify the legislator's deficiency. But a judge24
14. Id. at 1137b13-14. Aristotle's contention that laws should be general and universal is probably
a reply to Plato. See PLATO, STATESMAN 294, in 3 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 429, 443 (B. Jowett
trans., 4th ed. 1953) ("Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet the best thing of all is not
that the law should rule, but that the king should rule ... .
15. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b15-16.
16. Id. at 1137b17-19.
17. Id. at X, 1180a3-5.
18. Id. at V, 1129b19-25.
19. ld. at 1129a35-1129bl. While Aristotle divides justice between general justice (positive law) and
special justice (fairness), he asserts that special justice is a part of general justice. See id. at 1130b11-13
("[Wihat is unfair in not the same as what is lawless, but is related to it as part to whole, since whatever
is unfair is lawless, but not everything lawless is unfair.").
20. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 5 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945) ("Law and justice are two different concepts. Law as distinguished from justice is positive law.").
21. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1129b25-27.
22. See id. at 1137b28-29 ("[Oin some matters legislation is impossible .....
23. Id. at 1137b21-22.
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applying equity in adjudicating a particular case does not have unfettered
discretion. On the contrary, Aristotle insists that the equitable "is what the
legislator would have said himself had he been present [in the particular case],
and what he would have prescribed, had he known, in his legislation.,
25
Plainly stated, equity employs the hypothetical judgment of the legislator to
correct the deficiency resulting from the law's universality.
Aristotle provides an example of the operation of equity in the Rhetoric.
Suppose the legislature passes a law penalizing the wounding of a person with
an iron instrument. Since a description of all of the sizes and kinds of iron
instruments would be endless, the legislature simply makes a universal rule:
Wounding with an iron instrument is illegal. However, in the case of a person
who strikes another while wearing a ring, the person would be "guilty of a
wrong under the written law, but not in reality,,26 presumably because a mere
ring (unlike, say, an iron sword) does not fall into the class of dangerous iron
instruments. In this situation, equity would intercede to acquit the ring-wearer
of violating the law dealing with iron instruments. Equity thus conforms the
universal rule of law to the particular case, much like the flexible lead ruler used
in Lesbian building conforms itself to the shape of the stone.27
Aristotle closes his discussion of equity in the Nicomachean Ethics by
describing the equitable person. He is "not an exact stickler for justice in the
bad way, but tak[es] less than he might even though he has the law on his
side., 28 In other words, the equitable person is not preoccupied with inflexible
legal rules, even if enforcing the letter of the law would be to his or her benefit.
On the contrary, the equitable person is willing to compromise a legitimate legal
entitlement in order to fulfill the spirit of the law. Aristotle returns to the
description of the equitable person in Book VI, this time invoking the concept
of practical intelligence. He explains that the intellectual virtues of practical
intelligence, consideration, and understanding are ascribed to the same people
and also deal with particulars. Then Aristotle remarks that "someone has
comprehension and good consideration, or has considerateness, in being able to
judge about the matters that concern the practically intelligent person; for what
is equitable is the common concern of all good people in relations with other
people., 29  Simply put, equity is a relational concept that is especially
important to the person exercising practical intelligence.
24. The use of "judge" with reference to Aristotle's theory may be slightly misleading. Unlike
modern Anglo-American law, there was no single judge and no separate jury in fourth century Athens.
Instead, a large group of men known as 5tccat served as both judges and jurors in most cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 78-79. However, given that under modern law a judge performs most
of the tasks Aristotle ascribes to equity, this note will use "judge" to refer to the legal entity that
exercises equity.
25. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b22-24.
26. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I, 1374a35 (John Edwyn Sandys ed. & Richard Claverhouse Jebb trans.,
1909) [hereinafter RHETORIC].
27. See ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b30-31.
28. Id. at 1137b35-1138a2.
29. Id. at VI, 1143a25-32.
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Practical intelligence was an important concept for the Greeks of Aristotle's
time. Aristotle defines the term as "a state grasping the truth, involving reason,
concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being.,
30
Because it concerns action, practical intelligence must be grounded in
knowledge of the particular as well as the universal. More precisely, "it must
possess both [the universal and the particular knowledge] or the [particular]
more [than the universal]."31  And because it deals with particular facts,
practical intelligence involves experience as well as deliberation, since particulars
are known best as a result of experience. 2 Finally, practical intelligence is
intimately involved with political science because it incorporates both legislative
and judicial functions. 33
B. The Dominant Interpretation of Aristotle's Account of Equity
Since the account of equity in the Nicomachean Ethics takes up less than two
pages of Irwin's 298-page translation of the work, it is not surprising that
Aristotle's views on this important concept would be the subject of rival
interpretations. Nevertheless, one interpretation appears to have gained
ascendence among modern philosophers and lawyers. Most writers argue that
Aristotle employs equity to fill gaps in the law;34 that is, equity enables a judge
to adjudicate correctly a case presenting a novel issue on which the legislature
has enacted no law or that law is incomplete. In these cases, equity simply
takes the place of legislation; it is, according to Aristotle, "what the legislator
would have said himself if he had been present there .... ,"'
Consider the evidence in the Nicomachean Ethics supporting this interpreta-
tion. Aristotle suggests in several passages that gaps may exist in the law.
While we ideally "need laws concerned ... with all of life,",36 Aristotle admits
that "on some matters legislation is impossible. . . .,3' Hence, "not everything
is guided by law.",3' Rather, decrees and equity are necessary, presumably to
fill gaps where the legislature has failed to issue a relevant law. Granted, laws
are intended to require actions that express all of the virtues and to prohibit
actions that express all of the vices, 39 but Aristotle recognizes that laws framed
by the legislature may not achieve this ideal. In fact, he notes that a legislator's
"life would be too short" to enumerate all of the cases that may or may not fall
under a given rule.'
30. Id. at 1140b4-6.
31. Id. at 1141b21-22.
32. Id. at 1142a14-15.
33. Id. at 1141b23-24, 30-33.
34. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at V, 1137b23.
36. Id. at X, 1180a3-4.
37. Id. at V, 1137b28-29.
38. Id. at 1137b27-28.
39. Id. at 1129b23-24.
40. RHETORIC, supra note 26, at I, 1374a33.
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Upon closer examination of these passages, we can discern two distinct types
of cases in which Aristotle finds a gap in the law. First, in some cases, there
may be no enacted law covering the situation. These are what modern legal
scholars call "cases of first impression," for they present issues on which a judge
has no directly relevant law or precedent to apply. Aristotle denominates these
cases as situations in which it is impossible to legislate, "and so a decree is
needed.",41 Aristotle's recognition of this first type of case is explicitly noted
by Garrett Barden, who asserts that Aristotle "appealed to [equity] precisely
when there is no statute and no precedent that adequately covers the case in
hand."42 Second, in other cases, the enacted law might sweep too broadly in
that the law appears to address the situation, but the circumstances dictate a
different outcome. Aristotle contends that in these cases, "what happens
violates the [intended scope of] the universal rule."43 Here, the gap in the law
arises from the legislature's failure to contemplate a particular situation in which
a usually bad act does not-in that situation-constitute a vice. The Rhetoric's
hypothetical in which a person wearing a ring strikes another but is not actually
guilty of an assault with an iron instrument is a fine example of this type of
case.
44
In each of these two types of cases, there is a gap in the law. The role of
equity is to fill this gap, allowing an adjudication that otherwise would not be
possible because of the failure of the enacted law to address the particular
situation. As Wolfgang von Leyden puts it, Aristotle utilizes equity to cover "'a
gap left uncovered by law proper.' 45 Indeed, equity simply allows a judge to
fill the gap by saying what a legislator "would have prescribed, had he known,
in his legislation., 46 The judge steps into the legislator's shoes, exercising the
same sort of practical intelligence that the legislator would have utilized had he
or she foreseen the situation.
Under this reading, one thing is clear: Equity operates only where there is
no adequate law to cover the situation. If a situation falls within the bounds of
a law enacted by the legislature, there is no role for equity. As one commenta-
41. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b29
42. Garrett Barden, Aristotle's Notion of Epieikeia, in CREATIVITY AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF BERNARD LONERGAN 353, 362 (Matthew L. Lamb ed., 1981). This citation and the
following quotations from other commentators should not be taken to indicate that these authors hold
exclusively that Aristotelian equity merely fills gaps in laws. On the contrary, many of these authors
have complex views and, as Part V of this note will demonstrate, some of their observations are useful
in responding to the interpretation outlined here. Nevertheless, the quoted passages suggest that even
competent scholars of Aristotle can say some misleading things about how equity fills gaps in laws.
43. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b21.
44. See supra text accompanying note 26.
45. WOLFGANG VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 96 (1985) (quoting
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC bk 1, ch. xiii, §§ 12-14 (von Leyden's translation); see also MAX HAMBURGER,
MORALS AND LAW: THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTLE'S LEGAL THEORY 101 (1951) ("Equity constitutes
legal dynamics ... where there is a gap or defect in the formulation of the law."); Lawrence B. Solum,
Equity and the Rule of Law, in 36 NoMos 120, 124 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (Aristotle's view of equity
"corrects the law's generality by filling gaps in the law ....
46. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b23-24.
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tor has written, "the boundaries of the equitable are those outlined by the gaps
in the law. The law remains authoritative outside the limits of the equitable.
The equitable is not a competitor to the legally just but is adjoined to it for
cases which are not envisaged or adequately covered by the law."47 That is,
Aristotle utilizes equity to deal with the narrow circumstance in which the
legislature has not addressed a case through statutory law. Peter Charles Hoffer
argues:
[A] characteristic of Aristotle's formulation is that equity worked in the interstices of
law. If the law gave a full remedy, there was no need for equity. If equity was a
requirement for any legal system (for the laws could never be comprehensive enough
to do justice in all cases), it only applied to particular cases of injustice .... The
theory of equity was universal, but the practice of equity confined itself to individual
cases.
48
Hence, under the conventional interpretation of Aristotle's theory, a judge may
employ equity to "rectify the deficiency '49 of the enacted law only where the
enacted law failed to comprehend a problem addressed to the court.
III
EQUITY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
Equity is a tremendously important concept in Anglo-American law. In fact,
equity is so important and its use so widespread that it is impossible to discern
a single, unitary conception of the idea in Anglo-American law. Legal
historians often use "equity" to refer to the body of law administered by
England's Courts of Chancery, a system of courts that had a separate, though
sometimes overlapping jurisdiction distinct from common law courts."0 This
note does not address the history and procedures of courts of equity or the
vestiges of those procedures operating in the equitable remedies of modern
courts. Rather, the focus of this note is on equity in its more general sense, that
is, as a method of judicial decisionmaking emphasizing the particular facts of a
given case in an effort to reach a just outcome. Even in this more abstract
sense, the term "equity" has been subject to almost innumerable characteriza-
tions in Anglo-American law. Still, it is worthwhile to review the influence of
Aristotle's texts on Western jurisprudence and to generalize about the ensuing
role for equity in Anglo-American law. Indeed, by the mid-eighteenth century,
leading commentators insisted that equity was auxiliary to law and operated
only in the gaps between laws. In so doing, they delineated a role for equity
47. Constantine Georgiadis, Equitable and Equity in Aristotle, in JUSTICE, LAW AND METHOD IN
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 159, 162 (Spiro Panagiotou ed., 1987).
48. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 8-9 (1990).
49. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b21.
50. For the history of the Courts of Chancery from a modem perspective, see generally HOFFER,
supra note 48, ch. 2.
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that is perfectly consistent with the dominant interpretation of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.51
A. Aristotle's Influence on Anglo-American Law
Aristotle's influence on the concept of equity in Anglo-American law can
hardly be overstated. Early Anglo-American legal philosophers quoted
Aristotle liberally, and modem courts in the United States still occasionally cite
Aristotle's passages on equity.52 Yet even when legal philosophers and jurists
do not credit Aristotle, his exposition of equity has undoubtedly made a
tremendous contribution to the development of equitable adjudication,
especially the notion of "equitable interpretation" of statutes.
To understand the importance of Aristotle to Anglo-American law, we must
return to the revival of Aristotelianism in Medieval Europe. In the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, scholars succeeded in reintroducing Aristotelianism to
Western society. Among the notions recovered was Aristotle's notion of equity.
As St. Thomas Aquinas wrote in the Summa Theologica:
Now it happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the
common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful.
Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law
according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention to the common
good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful
to the general welfare, it should not be observed.53
In that passage, Aquinas implicitly called for the application of Aristotelian
equity to reform the law where it is imperfect because of its universality.54
Following Aquinas, Jean Gerson also referred to Aristotle in asserting that
"[e]quity, which the Philosopher [Aristotle] calls epieikeia, outweighs the
harshness of the law. It is, moreover, equity which considers all the particular
facts of a situation with justice tempered by the sweetness of mercy., 55
What is particularly interesting about the Medieval view of equity, however,
is the point at which it diverged from a strictly Aristotelian view. Recall that
Aristotle urges that equity is intimately connected to legislative intent; equity
is "what [the legislator] would have prescribed, had he known [about the
particular facts of an individual case], in his legislation.,5 6  Yet for Medieval
scholars, equity had a different reference point. As Aquinas wrote in a later
passage of the Summa Theologica, "[i]n these and like cases it is bad to follow
51. See supra part II.B.
52. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 245 n.4 (2d Cir. 1942); Simonds v.
Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 1978).
53. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA, Part II, 1st part, ques. 96, art. 6 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 3d ed. 1942).
54. See Stephen W. DeVine, The Concept of Epieikeia in the Chancellor of England's Enforcement
of the Feoffment to Uses Before 1535, 21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. R. 323, 333 (1987) (Aquinas's account is
a "classic restatement of the Aristotelian concept.").
55. 9 JEAN GERSON OEUVRES COMPLIETES 94, 95-96 (P. Glorieux ed., 1973), quoted in DeVine,
supra note 54, at 335 (DeVine's translation).
56. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b22-23.
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the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates
of justice and the common good."57 Aquinas entertained a broader notion of
discretion in the exercise of equitable judgment, for the "dictates of justice and
the common good" is certainly more variable and judge-centered than the
legislature's intent. As one commentator has correctly suggested, "Aquinas'[s]
brand of equitable construction would thus seem to involve the judge in a larger
measure of law making than Aristotle's., 58  Given Aquinas's heightened
appreciation for natural law, his reference to justice and the common good
rather than legislative intent is not surprising; however, as discussed below, it
provided ammunition for critics who viewed equity as judicial decisionmaking
without a standard.59
In the early sixteenth century, English scholars first embraced the
Aristotelian concept of equity. Initially, Christopher St. Germain, who was a
scholar in divinity rather than law, drew upon the works of Aristotle to maintain
that
[e]quity is a righteousness that considereth all the particular circumstances of the deed
[and] also is tempered with the sweetness of mercy. And such an equity must always
be observed in every law of man and in every general rule thereof, and that knew he
well who said thus .... It is not possible to make any general rule of the law but that
it shall fail in some case .... [Equity's] exception is secretly understood in every
general rule of every positive law.60
St. Germain's writings were followed by Edward Hake's Epieikeia, which was
directed at solicitors and chancellors in England's Courts of Equity. Perhaps
anticipating the criticism of Selden and others who argued that equity varied
like the length of the Chancellor's foot, Hake emphasized that equity did not
arise from a judge's unfettered discretion, but was an integral part of any
statute. It should not be supposed, he wrote, that
Equity were a thing out of the law or beside the law, or as if it were the Equity of the
judge, and not of the law, but that the Equity thereby meant is to be taken (as it is
indeed) to be within the law, and that it being there found is to be applied by the
judge of the law according to the particularity of the case that is before him ...."
Moreover, unlike Aquinas, Hake emphasized Aristotle's notion that the exercise
of equity was limited to implementing the legislature's intent:
[Ilf [it] should happen that there were a case which being brought to the words of the
law were likely to receive rule or judgment contrary to the law of God, against the law
of Reason, what else could the judge conceive in such a case but that, while he should
stick in the letter of the law, he should but insist in the very husk and skin of the law,
57. AQUINAS, supra note 53, Part II, 2d part, ques. 120, art. 1 (emphasis added).
58. Raymond B. Marcin, Epieikeia; Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes, 10 CONN.
L. REV. 377, 391 (1978) (emphasis in original).
59. See infra part IV.A.
60. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1523), reprinted in 91 PUBLICATIONS OF
THE SELDEN SOCIETY, at 95, 97 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974) (spelling modernized).
Plucknett and Barton use the spelling "St. German," but others generally use "St. Germain."
61. EDWARD HAKE, EPIEIKEIA: A DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THREE PARTS 46 (D. Yale ed., 1953)
(circa 1580-90), quoted in Marcin, supra note 58, at 395 (emphasis in original; spelling modernized).
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and were therefore to turn himself by and by to investigate the intent and hidden
meaning of the law?62
In these ways, Hake made an early attempt to buttress courts of equity against
the criticism that equity provided unlimited discretion to judges. But as we shall
now observe, Hake's attempt to limit the exercise of equity in Anglo-American
law was quickly discarded in favor of a far more important restriction.
B. The Gap-Filling Role for Equity in Anglo-American Law
Surely the most important, and the most enduring, purported limitation on
the exercise of equity in Anglo-American law is the notion that equity operates
merely to fill gaps in the written law. Of course, judges and jurisprudential
scholars have not been entirely unified in restricting equity to that circumscribed
role.3  Yet the dominant characterization of equity in Anglo-American
law-like the dominant interpretation of Aristotle's notion of Greek equity-has
limited its use to instances in which there is a gap in statutory law or judicial
precedent.
The contention that equity operates only where there is a gap in the law
held sway as early as the eighteenth century. Henry Home, Lord Kames of
Scotland, put the idea plainly, writing that "equity commences at the limits of the
common law, and in certain circumstances neglected by common law.. . . And
thus a court of equity, accompanying the law of nature in its general refine-
ments, enforces every natural duty that is not provided for by common law. ' 64
Put another way, equity works only in the interstices of the common law, filling
gaps left by the common law's often haphazard development. This idea was
echoed in the influential works of William Blackstone: "[T]he liberty of
considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, lest
thereby we destroy all law and leave the decision of every question entirely in
the breast of the judge., 65
Jurisprudential scholars have carried the notion that equity simply fills gaps
in the law into twentieth century Anglo-American legal theory. The division
between law and equity is most visible in a strain of modern legal theory
prominently represented by H.L.A. Hart. Although he rarely used the term
62. HAKE, supra note 61, at 16, quoted in Marcin, supra note 58, at 395-96 (emphasis added;
spelling modernized).
63. See infra part V.
64. HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 42 (2d Ed. 1767) (emphasis added).
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *62. Commentators have often noted Blackstone's
influential attempt to restrict equity to a gap-filling role:
William Blackstone, a conservative jurist whose influence on the interpretation of common law,
statute, and equity was felt throughout the English-speaking world, recognized that the
duality-the periodic recrudescence of higher principles of natural obligations-inherent in
equity still rendered it a loose cannon on the ship of state. In his Vinerian lectures on the law,
later published as Commentaries on the Law of England (1765-69), he insisted that equity was
purely auxiliary to law. Narrowly reading Aristotle and emphasizing the technical side of
English and Scottish equity treatises ... there was but one equity [for Blackstone], and it had
nothing to do with universal principles of conscience or fairness.
HOFFER, supra note 48, at 11-12.
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"equity," Hart essentially envisioned equity as a necessary component of
adjudicating difficult cases because it fills gaps in laws previously enacted by the
legislature or adopted by the courts.66 Under this view, most cases faced by
judges are straightforward; they involve the simple application of legal concepts
to a set of facts. Other "hard" cases, however, involve novel legal situations
that require judges who endeavor to act fairly to move beyond formally enacted
laws, filling the gaps in those laws. It is worthwhile to quote from Hart's
influential theory at length:
The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much
must be left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of
circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from case to case.
None the less, the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both
of officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications
of variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case.67
Hart therefore insisted that equity is relevant only in difficult (and relatively
rare) cases where there is no clear statutory law or precedent that controls the
case. The bulk of cases, by contrast, are straightforward applications of law to
fact and require no reference to equity.
Not surprisingly, the view that equity only fills gaps in the law has found
favor among the majority of modern Anglo-American judges, too. Consider the
opinion of Judge Jerome Frank, a respected legal philosopher, in Commissioner
v. Beck's Estate.6" In that case, the court decided a complex statutory issue,
holding that a taxpayer was not entitled to a tax deduction for certain insurance
premiums paid through an irrevocable insurance trust. But the language of the
court in interpreting the relevant income and gift tax provisions is particularly
interesting. "[C]ourts may not, as legislatures may, roam at large, confined only
by the Constitution," Judge Frank asserted; "their function, when dealing with
... legislation, does not go beyond that of filling in small gaps left by the
legislature-and to closing the gaps in accordance with what appears to have
been the legislative purpose."69
Likewise, the comments of the dissenting judge in the classic case Riggs v.
Palmer" are consistent with the prevailing notion that equity operates only to
fill gaps in the law. The facts of the case are engaging. A sixteen-year-old boy
murdered his grandfather in order to obtain the immediate enjoyment of his
inheritance. Under the plain meaning of the applicable New York statutes, the
boy would have inherited a portion of his grandfather's estate according to the
terms of the will. However, the majority invoked Aristotle's discussion of
equity and refused to enforce the will. Dissenting Judge Gray objected to the
66. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 7 (2d ed. 1994).
67. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
68. 129 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1942).
69. Id. at 245. Judge Frank cites Aristotle's Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics as authority for this
proposition. Id. n.4.
70. 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) (Gray, J. dissenting). The majority opinion in this case is
considered in a subsequent part of this note. See infra part V.C.
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majority's application of equity because he found no gap in the statutory law.
He wrote:
If I believed that the decision of the question could be effected by considerations of
an equitable nature, I should not hesitate to assent to views which commend
themselves to the conscience. But the matter does not lie within the domain of
conscience. We are bound by the rigid rules of law, which have been established by
the legislature . . . . In the absence of such legislation [prohibiting a slayer from
inheriting from the victim], the courts are not empowered to institute such a system
of remedial justice.7
Apparently, Judge Gray worried that the exercise of equity where there was no
clear gap in the law would amount to unjustifiable judicial legislation.72
Of course, Anglo-American judges have good reason to be concerned about
the use of equity, if by equity we mean so-called judicial legislation. Following
Montesquieu's and Locke's ideas on the separation of powers,73 it is a cardinal
principle of both British and American constitutionalism that legislatures alone
are empowered to enact laws, while courts merely interpret and apply the laws.
This notion is eminently justifiable. And, as this note will now discuss, the ideal
of separation of powers and concern about unfettered, unaccountable judicial
power animate two major criticisms of equity's role as a gap-filling device.
IV
CRITICISMS OF EQUITY
Parts II and III of this note have attempted to show that in both the
dominant interpretation of Aristotle's works as well as the subsequent writings
of Anglo-American judges and theorists, equity has been viewed as a device to
fill gaps in laws. Unfortunately, this conception of equity presents a set of
alternating difficulties for Aristotle's political theory as well as for modern
lawyers who adopt a similar conception. On the one hand, if equity is necessary
simply because it is impossible for the legislature to enact statutes completely
covering every issue, would it not be possible-and perhaps even prudent-to
abolish the legislature altogether in favor of personal rulings by judges? On the
other hand, if a state maintains a legislature that continually enacts laws as
society develops, would not the role for equity diminish as the legal code
expands?
Before turning to these problems directly, it is important to note again that
these criticisms are at least partly derived from post-Enlightenment concerns
71. Id. at 191-92.
72. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's remark about equitable lawmaking working only in the gaps
of the law expresses much the same point. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially ... .
73. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6 (Thomas Nugent trans., David Wallace
Carrithers ed., 1977) (1748) ("[T]here is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers."); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, ch. 12
(Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (3d ed. 1698).
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about the separation of powers, especially as manifested in U.S. constitutional
law. An elemental principle of the United States Constitution holds that it falls
to the legislature to enact laws and to courts to adjudicate cases.74 The
separation of powers has become perhaps the most important constitutional
doctrine governing the operation of and interaction between the branches of
government in the United States. But this doctrine is a modern conception that
is only crudely recognized by Aristotle. To be sure, Aristotle maintains in the
Politics that legislative action is often preferred to adjudication because the
former is the product of collective action and thus less subject to corruption.75
But this realization is a far cry from adopting a comprehensive doctrine of
separation of powers in which each branch of government is created with certain
powers and clear limitations in order to check and balance the powers of the
other branches. The point is clear: While Aristotle is open to some criticism
because he did not foresee the importance of separating governmental powers,
it is somewhat anachronistic to expect him to offer solutions to a problem of
twentieth century Anglo-American, not fourth century Athenian, government.
Similarly, it is crucial to account for the tremendous differences between the
operation of the court systems of fourth century Athens and twentieth century
America. Take a typical criminal case today in the United States. A
government prosector tries a defendant for a specific offense defined by the
criminal code. During the trial, a judge decides issues of law, while the jury
determines the ultimate issues of fact. Athenian law could hardly be more
different. In fourth century Athens, there were no prosecutors for the
government. Rather, defendants were prosecuted by their victims.76  Also,
criminal offenses were not defined in the primitive Athenian statutes.77 And
there was no judge to decide issues of law. Rather, a large body of 5 atXtGtt,
citizens who acted collectively as judges and jurors for a case, determined
questions of both law and fact, rarely if ever distinguishing between the two
types of issues.7 8 Typically, 500 8tcctaz6t, selected from the same body of
citizens that composed the Athenian legislature, heard a case.79 Thus, unlike
modern Anglo-American law, under Athenian law there was little concern
about "judicial legislation," since any court was comprised of a large body of the
same citizens who formed the legislature. In Aristotle's day, there was simply
no reason to be concerned about the pernicious effects of judicial legislation.
74. Cf. U.S. CONST. arts. I, III.
75. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS III, 1286a21-35 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Trevor J. Saunders ed., 1981)
[hereinafter POLITICS].
76. S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 91-92 (1993).
77. Id. at 61 n.14 (A "classic example" of a law without defined terms "is the law quoted at Dem.
21.47-'if a man commits hubris [wanton aggression], the following procedure shall be available against
him'-without saying what hubris was.").
78. Id. at 82-83.
79. Id. at 83.
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With these qualifications in mind, let us turn to two important criticisms
directed at the concept of equity as presented in the writings of Aristotle as well
as in Anglo-American law.
A. Equity Undermines the Rule of Law
A concept of equity that merely fills gaps in the law may be criticized
initially for its tendency to undermine the development of a system of
universally applicable laws. Consider the opinion of one modern appellate
court:
Equitable justice is "better" than the legal kind, Aristotle contended, because by
looking to the circumstances of the matter under adjudication it can cure the error that
may result from the universal application of a legal generality. But at some point,
though admittedly not one that is always clear, the introduction of equity challenges
the development and administration of an ordered system of rules, a problem of
considerably greater concern today than at the time and place in which Aristotle
wrote.80
In his discussion of Aristotelian equity, von Leyden frames the objection as
follows:
[A] critic might argue.., that precisely because laws are formulated in general terms,
personal rule (single or collective) should take the place of legal sovereignty. This
argument has always been the stock in trade of monarchists and all those favouring
personal initiative and governmental power over and against the rule of law."1
Indeed, if it is impossible to enact laws to anticipate all circumstances, yet equity
nevertheless permits fair adjudication in those instances, why not expand the
realm of the equitable to encompass all cases? Or, to frame the issue in H.L.A.
Hart's vocabulary, if a judge has discretion to apply equity in hard cases, would
it not be both possible and perhaps preferable to allow a judge to have similar
discretion in all cases? The broad exercise of equity, which is tailored to the
particular circumstances of an act, would appear superior to universal statutory
rules, since equity faces none of the problems Aristotle attributes to universal
rules "that cannot be correct" precisely because of their universality.82
Of course, the vast majority of Anglo-American legal theorists reject wholly
individualized, personal rulings by judges. Few would dispute that judging cases
wholly on their equities is both ineffectual and subject to corruption. For
example, Henry Sumner Maine contended:
A community which never hesitated to relax rules of written law whenever they stood
in the way of an ideally perfect decision on the facts of particular cases, would only,
if it bequeathed any body of judicial principles to posterity, bequeath one consisting
of the ideas of right and wrong which happened to be prevalent at the time. Such
jurisprudence would contain no framework to which the more advanced conceptions
of subsequent ages could be fitted. . .. "
80. Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 202 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984), vacated by 702 P.2d 197 (Cal. 1985) (citations omitted).
81. VON LEYDEN, supra note 45, at 95.
82. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b16.
83. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 73 (3d Am. ed. 1888).
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More recently, Judge Jack Weinstein has noted that the exercise of equity, if it
involves uncontrolled flexibility and individuality in judicial decisionmaking, can
lead to judicial tyranny and the abandonment of useful standards.'
Likewise, even though Aristotle was not writing with an eye toward the
development of modern law (as Maine was) or with concern for judicial
integrity (as Weinstein does), even his political theory seems to reject the wholly
particularized rule of equity. While the logical conclusion of his discussion of
equity might be to replace legislated rules with judicial equity, Aristotle
contends near the end of the Nicomachean Ethics that universal laws are
necessary to compel people to act virtuously and to provide a universal concept
of good.85 Aristotle also argues that legislation is preferred to adjudication
because it is the product of collective action and therefore less subject to
corruption."
But the problem is that considerations within equity itself provide no
principled reason to choose legislation over equity, despite the fact that other
considerations in Aristotle's doctrine and Anglo-American law militate against
the unfettered use of equitable rulings. If equity is a device to fill gaps in the
law, there is no reason that it could not displace the rule of law altogether.
Indeed, discussions of equity in Aristotle and Anglo-American law rarely furnish
a convincing reason why an expansive application of equity would be either
impossible or unwarranted on its own terms. Quite the contrary, both Aristotle
and early Anglo-American theorists implicitly assent to a broad utilization of
equity when they insist that equity is superior to legal justice.87 Such a notion
suggests that a judge's application of equity rather than a legislature's enactment
of law would do no harm to the pursuit of justice.
Simply put, if equity can fill gaps in the law-taking the place of law where
the legislature has enacted no statute or an incomplete statute-there seems
little reason that a sufficient number of judges employing equity to adjudicate
individual cases could not wholly supplant the legislative function. And if
Aristotle and his successors are correct that equity is "better" than legal
justice, 8 there seems little reason it should not.
B. Equity Should Disappear as the Legal Code Expands
Alternatively, if a state retains its legislature and the legislators are
sufficiently attentive to their task of creating an ordered system of rules, the
realm of the equitable should steadily decrease. That is to say, if it is correct
84. Jack B. Weinstein, Justice and Mercy-Law and Equity, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 818-19
(1984) (noting that the approach of 19th century French judges, "who abandoned rules of law
completely and instead engaged in ad hoc decisionmaking according to the equities of the cases," was
"individualism run riot").
85. ETHICS, supra note 7, at X, 1180a5, 1180b14.
86. POLITICS, supra note 75, at III, 1286a21-35.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 57.
88. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, at 1137b9.
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that equity operates only in the gaps of the law, the exercise of equity would
necessarily diminish as the legal code becomes more developed. Roger Shiner
expresses the point admirably:
In the early stages of development of a legal system there are few laws
[S]ituations arise which are not covered by the laws, or where a decision by way of
strict application of those laws would be unjust. Courts should then exercise equitable
judgment in the open area not covered by the laws. However, the body of law will
grow, both by legislative and judicial activity. The area open for equitable judgment
will decrease. In a fully developed modem legal system, there will be very little room
for equity in the original sense at all.89
This objection is especially problematic for Aristotle's political theory, since he
apparently foresaw the development of a legal code that left little room for
judicial discretion. As he proclaims at the outset of the Rhetoric, "it is most
desirable that well-drawn laws should, as far as possible, define everything
themselves, leaving as few points as possible to the discretion of the judges
,90 The objection is also a problem for modern Anglo-American law. If
Judge Frank is correct that equity may only fill small gaps in statutes enacted
by the legislature,91 there would appear to be less and less room for the
exercise of equity as statutory law becomes more sophisticated, as it has over
the past two centuries.
But neither Aristotle nor most Anglo-American legal scholars appear to
assert that the exercise of equity will disappear as the legal code develops.
Given that Aristotle views equity as "superior" to legal justice,92 it would seem
strange if he were to assent to its disappearance. Likewise, most Anglo-
American legal observers, including Douglas Laycock, have proclaimed "the
triumph of equity," asserting that "[t]he war between law and equity is over"
and "[e]quity won ... [and] is ordinary, not extraordinary, in remedies,
procedure, and substance."93
As such, the failure to account for the gradual disappearance of equity as the
legal code develops presents difficulties for Aristotelian and Anglo-American
legal theory. It is problematic for Aristotle because he contends that although
both equity and legal justice are parts of justice, equity is the better part. It is
problematic for Anglo-American law because, despite the tremendous expansion
of statutory law, the exercise of equity continues unabated.
89. Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle's Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1994).
90. RHETORIC, supra note 26, at I, 1354a31-32.
91. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
92. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b11.
93. Laycock, supra note 4, at 53-54.
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V
REEXAMINING THE ROLE OF EQUITY IN ARISTOTELIANISM AND ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW
Having advanced a pair of formidable objections to the dominant interpreta-
tion of equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American law, let us now consider
how a different conception of equity can avoid the Scylla of arbitrariness in a
system of individual case adjudication and the Charybdis of irrelevance under
a complex statutory scheme. The objections stated in Part IV are predicated
upon a misinterpretation of the role of equity. The proper role of equity is not
simply to fill gaps in the law. Instead, equity consists primarily in a judge's
exercise of practical intelligence to conform universal laws to particular
situations. Rather than filling a gap in the law, equity fills inevitable gaps in the
legislatures' foresight when the legislature makes a general legal rule without
knowing the facts of any individual case in which it will be applied. In
Aristotle's words, equity operates whenever the legislature's universally
applicable law "falls short" of achieving justice precisely because of its
universality.94 In such cases, equity adapts the law to fit the case at hand.
Since equity operates to conform universal laws to particular cases, a state
would never be justified in abandoning the enactment of universal laws in favor
of decisionmaking solely on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, given that a
legislature cannot know the particular facts of future cases, the function of
equity-applying universal law to individual cases-will exist regardless of how
developed a legal code may become. Hence, equity is not a competitor to a
legal tradition that emphasizes the importance of universal laws; instead, equity
is a necessary component to that tradition because it allows judges to apply
universal laws to each individual case they adjudicate.
To show why the operation of equity should be viewed in this way, we must
take a fresh look at the writings of Aristotle. Indeed, a different interpretation
of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics avoids the criticisms outlined earlier and
helps chart a different path for the role of equity in Anglo-American law.
Before returning to Aristotle's work, however, it is helpful to consider the views
of a modern Anglo-American legal philosopher, Roscoe Pound.95 Pound was
one of the most prolific legal scholars of the twentieth century. His vision for
the role of equity-although it has not gained ascendance in Western law-is
an appropriate counterpart to Aristotle's writings, for Pound takes seriously the
94. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b21.
95. Roscoe Pound lived from 1870 to 1964 and served as Dean of Harvard Law School for several
years. He is an appropriate representative of Anglo-American legal thought because of his thorough
knowledge of legal history and his tremendous influence on 20th century legal philosophy. See generally
DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974). Of course, other scholars in
jurisprudence could serve as representatives of the Anglo-American tradition. For example, one author
has recently published an admirable comparison of Aristotle's view of equity to those of H.L.A. Hart
and Ronald Dworkin. See generally Shiner, supra note 89.
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criticisms of equity outlined in Part IV of this note, yet steadfastly defends its
role in a legal system committed to the rule of codified law.
A. Roscoe Pound's View of Equity
Roscoe Pound approaches the role of equity in the Anglo-American system
from a thoroughly modern perspective. Unlike Aristotle, Pound considered the
justifications for the operation of equity from within a fully developed legal
system. He was fully aware of the criticisms of equity and, in fact, sympathized
with the critics. Yet, like Aristotle, Pound was an unyielding apologist for the
operation of equity within a system of codified law. Indeed, Pound's views
roughly parallel those of Aristotelianism, and his conception of equity is striking
because it departs from the prevailing view that equity simply fills gaps in the
law.
Pound's conception of equity is remarkably cohesive, despite the fact that
he developed it over a period of nearly six decades of legal scholarship. His
writings never waver in their defense of equity and its role in judicial decision-
making.96 To Pound, equity is "the idea of wider discretion, greater freedom
of application, [and] more elasticity in view of particular cases.. . ."' Perhaps
unwittingly, Pound adopts the Aristotelian definition of equity by citing two
later sources: "Blackstone was not all in error, much as our modern text writers
differ with him, when he gave equity the Grotian definition of 'the correction
of that wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient."' 98 But most
importantly, in Pound's view, equity is not merely a tool to fill gaps in the
statutory law; rather, it plays a central part in adjudication even where there are
few gaps. Indeed, "in no legal system, however minute and detailed its body of
rules, is justice administered wholly by rule without any recourse to the will of
the judge and his personal sense of what should be done to achieve a just result
in the cause before him." 99
In fact, Pound views the relationship between statutory law and the judicial
exercise of equity as a foundational question for all of jurisprudence. "Almost
all of the problems of jurisprudence," he writes, "come down to a fundamental
one of rule and discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration
of justice by the more or less trained intuition of experienced magistrates."'"°
96. This note does not attempt to introduce every piece Pound wrote regarding the operation of
equity. However, it does examine Pound's more substantial writings on the subject from every period
throughout his life. His works on the subject are surprisingly consistent, as is his conviction that the
application of equity is an essential component to any modem legal system. Compare, e.g., Roscoe
Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 35 (1905) [hereinafter Decadence of Equity]
("[Ejquity is a part of law, in the sense that it is necessary to the working of any legal system.") with
ROSCOE POUND, 2 JURISPRUDENCE § 65, at 242 (1959) [hereinafter JURISPRUDENCE] ("[E]quitable or
individualized application of legal precepts is called for more and more in the law of today.").
97. Decadence of Equity, supra note 96, at 22.
98. Id at 23 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61).
99. 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 75, at 355.
100. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (rev. ed. 1954)
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHY OF LAW]; see also ROSCOE POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 40 (1951)
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To Pound, judicial equity and statutory law may be conceptually antithetical to
one another but need not conflict in practice. As he notes, "we have to take
account of [both equitable discretion and the rule of law], either of which
carried to its logical extreme negates the other, [but] which nevertheless are
equally necessary for achievement of our practical task and must be kept in
balance."' 0 ' Thus, while he accepts that the theoretical conflict between law
and equity "will not down, 10 2 Pound argues that, in practice, the tension
between equitable discretion and justice according to universally applicable laws
creates "'mutual checks and corrections of one another.""0 3 That is to say,
both general laws and equity are essential to the legal process: The former
provides stability in the law, whereas the latter allows for necessary growth. In
the end, Pound views both general lawmaking and individualized equity as
central to political and economic security:
Individualization in application is a problem in all systems of law which have reached
maturity. In all such systems jurists are confronted by a need of balance between the
general security and security of the economic order, on the one hand, calling for
certainty, uniformity, and predictability, and the individual life, on the other hand,
calling for individualized application. °4
Nevertheless, Pound recognizes that the tendency in modem Anglo-
American law was to restrict the operation of equitable, discretionary decision-
making. Partly due to the influence of nineteenth century analytical jurispru-
dence, which considered the application of legal precepts akin to the mechanical
application of a mathematical formula, equitable discretion was commonly
viewed as contrary to the rule of law.'0 5 Moreover, the increasing demands
for uniformity and predictability in commercial transactions and other areas of
economic life tended to restrict the individualized decisionmaking that
characterized equitable adjudication. "[A]I1 the circumstances of modem life,"
Pound writes, "draw us to the strictly legal side, and the judge, bound hand and
foot by a code and the maxim that that law is best which leaves least to the
discretion of the judge is our natural goal . . . ."" Pound also understands
[hereinafter JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW] (The definition of law has "moved back and forth in the
history of the science of law according to the circumstances of legal systems and the agencies by which
their precepts have been formulated for the time being. It comes to a question of putting stress on one
or the other of two elements in the legal system--of whether to emphasize rule or discretion. This is
one of the persistent problems in the science of law.").
101. JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, supra note 100, at 43.
102. Decadence of Equity, supra note 96, at 24.
103. Id (quoting SHELDON AMOS, SCIENCE OF LAW 57-58 (1900)).
104. 4 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 116, at 20; see also Roscoe Pound, Runaway Courts in the
Runaway World, 10 UCLA L. REV. 729, 732 (1963) ("When, in the increasingly complex and
continually changing details of individual relations in a changing world, courts adjust conflicting claims
by reason instead of by rigid rules formulated in the simpler codes of the past, the unchanging laws of
Medes and the Persians have ceased to apply.... So, too, law must be stable and yet it cannot stand
still." (internal quotation omitted)).
105. See 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 68, at 242.
106. Decadence of Equity, supra note 96, at 21.
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that the complaint that equity allows for arbitrary personal rule contrary to the
rule of law °7 might have tremendous persuasive appeal. He notes:
[W]e commonly think of [judicial discretion] at its worst, as in the stories of Harun al
Raschid in the Arabian Nights, where one wrongdoer who tells a clever story and
amuses the Commander of the Faithful will go free while the severest penalty will be
inflicted on another who adds dullness to no greater crime and bores his judge."°
How then should we view equity in a system dominated by statutory law?
Pound's views, though incomplete, are instructive. According to him, the
judicial process, that is, the decision of a particular case according to general
laws, consists of four elements:
(1) Finding the facts, i.e. ascertaining the state of facts to which legal precepts are to
be applied in order to reach a determination; (2) finding the law, i.e. ascertaining the
legal precept or precepts applicable to the facts found; (3) interpreting the precept or
precepts to be applied, i.e. ascertaining their meaning by genuine interpretation; and
(4) applying the precept or precepts so found and interpreted to the case in hand."°
Pound has nothing more to say about the first step in the judicial process,
finding the facts. But his observations about the next three steps are important
because they provide clues about how Pound views equity in the adjudicative
process.
Pound recognizes that finding the law, the second step in the judicial process,
is occasionally straightforward. Indeed, "[f]inding the law may consist merely
in laying hold of a prescribed text of a code or statute.""() More often,
however, finding the law is itself a process heavily influenced by equitable
judicial discretion. Pound contends that, in many cases, finding the law is
not so simple. More than one text is at hand which might apply; more than one rule
is potentially applicable, and the parties are contending which shall be made the basis
of a decision. In that event the several rules must be interpreted in order that
intelligent selection may be made."'
And, of course, this discretionary element cannot be removed simply by making
the distinctions within a legal code more minute and complex. In fact, the more
complex and detailed a legal code becomes, the more likely it is that two or
more rules might apply to a given set of facts.'12 Hence, even the preliminary
attempt to find the law applicable to a particular case involves equitable
discretion.
107. See supra part IV.A.
108. 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 75, at 355 (citation omitted).
109. 4 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 115, at 5-6 (citations omitted). In An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Law, originally published 37 years before his five-volume Jurisprudence, Pound expounds
a similar list of steps involved in adjudication. The earlier list differs in one important respect. It does
not include the first step of Pound's later enumeration, "finding the facts." See PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
supra note 100, at 48. The inclusion of fact-finding as a part of adjudication is significant, especially
when considering a correct interpretation of Aristotle's concept equity. See infra part V.C.
110. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100, at 50.
111. Id.
112. See id.; JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, supra note 100, at 86 ("Attempt to control application
of law by minute and detailed legislation is a mistake.").
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Next, Pound submits that interpretation of the law, the third step in the
judicial process, also involves a good measure of equitable discretion."1 3 "The
greater part of what goes by the name of interpretation," he writes, "is really
a lawmaking process, a supplying of new law where no rule or no sufficient rule
is at hand."' 1 4 That is to say, the legislative process and the judicial process
run into one another."5 Where the legislative process leaves off, the judicial
process takes up. Granted, "[ilt is the function of the legislative organ to make
laws. But from the nature of the case it cannot make laws so complete and all
embracing that the judicial organ will not be obliged to exercise a certain
lawmaking function also."'n 6 Unfortunately, Pound is not more specific about
the precise lawmaking function of a court. Still, he plainly states that the "pious
fiction" of mechanical interpretation of law, which would be little more than the
deduction of "the logical content of authoritatively established principles," is,
in reality, a process by which judges shape the law even as they interpret it."7
Finally, Pound argues that the application of law, the fourth step in the
judicial process, also involves equitable decisionmaking. In the context of
applying the law to a particular case, equity is not so much about discretionary
interpretation of law as it is about taking account of individual differences
among cases. Hence, a "judicial decision [cannot] ignore [a case's] special
aspects and exclude all individualization in application without sacrificing the
social interest in the individual life through making justice too wooden and
mechanical.""' 8 On the contrary, Anglo-American law, especially in the
United States, "has been manifest in a tendency to seek extra-legal attainment
of just results [in individual cases] while preserving the form of law.""' 9 Thus,
while Pound believes that many advocates of the equitable theory of application
of law have gone "too far" in the direction of unbridled judicial authority, he
also notes that Anglo-American law must find a way to "achieve an individual-
ization which we deny in theory . . . ."" In short, Pound understands that it
is manifestly ridiculous to believe that application of the law to a particular case
means nothing more than "apply[ing] Webster's dictionary to the compiled
statutes," as those who support mechanical application of law apparently
believe. 12 '
113. Of course, this is especially true when a court explicitly invokes "equitable interpretation" or
"equitable construction of a statute." See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
114. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100, at 49-50.
115. Id. at 51; 4 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 115, at 6-7.
116. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100, at 51.
117. Id. at 52.
118. Id. at 53. Here, Pound cites Aristotle for the contrary thesis that "a court should have no
discretion. To [Aristotle] the judicial office was a Procrustean one of fitting each case to the legal be,
if necessary by surgical operation." Id This interpretation of Aristotle's writings is simply wrong. See
infra part V.C.
119. 4 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 115, at 14.
120. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100, at 63.
121. Pound, supra note 104, at 732.
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In the end, then, Pound recognizes that the process of adjudication is
intimately associated with equitable decisionmaking at virtually every turn. To
him, there simply is no other way to achieve the necessary individualization of
the law that justice requires. He puts the idea best in an address delivered at
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri:
Law is more than an aggregate of laws. It is what makes laws living instruments of
justice. It is what enables courts to administer justice by means of laws, to restrict
them by reason where the lawmaker exceeds his reason, and to develop them to the
full scope of reason where the lawmaker falls short of it.'22
Law is not merely the collection of statutes enacted by the legislature but is also
the singular decision made in a specific case affecting distinct individuals. As
such, law must have a particular, individualized element to it. For Pound, that
element is equity, or, as he frequently declared, it is "reason applied to experi-
ence."
123
B. The Unanswered Questions in Pound's Concept of Equity
Unfortunately, Pound never developed an entirely coherent concept of
equity's role in the adjudicative process. To be sure, the observations laid out
in the previous section of this note are helpful. For example, they suggest that
equity is not merely a tool to fill gaps in the statutory law. Rather, equity is
exercised at every stage of a judge's analysis of a particular case. Likewise, they
point out that much of what goes on under the guise of mere "interpretation"
or "application" of law actually involves something more. The problem,
however, is that Pound never specifies exactly what that "something more" is.
He tells us that the function of the judge is to apply reason to experience but
does not specify how that should occur. He tells us that the first step in the
judicial process is to find the facts but then fails to discuss the impact of that
step on a judge's decisionmaking. And he tells us that interpretation often
functions in a lawmaking capacity but never specifies how so.
Make no mistake, Pound clearly details methods of applying universal law.
Consider the following passage:
In Anglo-American law today there are no less than seven agencies for individualizing
the application of law. We achieve an individualization in practice: (1) through the
discretion of courts in the application of equitable remedies; (2) through legal
standards applied to conduct generally when injury results and also to certain relations
and callings; (3) through the power of juries to render general verdicts; (4) through
latitude of judicial application involved in finding the law; (5) through devices for
adjusting penal treatment to the individual offender; (6) through informal methods of
judicial administration in petty courts; and (7) through administrative tribunals.' 24
122. JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, supra note 100, at 60.
123. Pound, supra note 104, at 734; see also JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, supra note 100, at 91
(Law "presupposes a life measured by reason, a legal order measured by reason, and a judicial process
carried on by applying a reasoned technique to experience developed by reason and reason tested by
experience.").
124. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100, at 64.
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But Pound does not develop a coherent philosophical framework through which
these methods might be unified and justified. For that endeavor, it is helpful
to return to the work of Aristotle.
C. Pound's Questions Answered: A Different Interpretation of Aristotle's
Account of Equity
Earlier this note summarized the dominant interpretation of Aristotle's
concept of equity." That interpretation, which coincides with the dominant
interpretation of the role of equity in Anglo-American law, holds that equity
operates to fill gaps in the law. Unfortunately, as Part IV of this note
demonstrated, that vision of equity is subject to at least two serious criticisms.
Might there be a better explication of Aristotle's theory that simultaneously
avoids those criticisms and extends Pound's theory by addressing its unanswered
questions, thereby providing a more sound justification for the exercise of equity
in Anglo-American law? Consider the following interpretation.
Throughout his writings, Aristotle contends that equity consists in
conforming the legislature's general law to a particular case. The "nature of
what is equitable," he argues in the Nicomachean Ethics, is "rectification of law
in so far as the universality of law makes it deficient."' 26  Like the special
ruler used by Lesbian builders that adapts itself to the shape of a stone,'27
equity adapts a general standard of law to a particular situation. This point is
expressed more directly in the Rhetoric, where equity is said to apply when it
is necessary for the legislature "to lay down an absolute rule, but [it is] not
really possible to lay down more than a general rule . . . ."' For Aristotle,
then, a central feature of equity is that it accounts for the particular facts of a
case and conforms the law to the individual situation, rectifying any deficiency
of the law that may result from its universality.
Given that equity consists of the intellectual endeavor of applying general
rules to particular cases, Aristotle's discussion of the intellectual virtues is
significant. Indeed, Aristotle's identification of practical intelligence as the
intellectual virtue that governs the application of universal rules to particular
circumstances is central to a complete understanding of equity. In a passage
contrasting practical intelligence with other virtues of thought, Aristotle
contends that practical intelligence is not about "universals only" but is
"concerned with action and action is about particulars."129  Yet he is also
careful to point out that when a person exercises practical intelligence, "there
is a ruling [science]." 3° With respect to adjudications, the exercise of practical
intelligence involves the application of a controlling rule-a general law-to a
125. See supra part lI.B.
126. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b26-27.
127. Id. at 1137b29-31.
128. RHETORIC, supra note 26, at I, 1374a29.
129. ETHICS, supra note 7, at VI, 1141b14-16.
130. Id. at 1141b21-22.
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specific action-an individual case. In Aristotle's words, "since intelligence is
concerned with action, it must possess both [the universal and the particular
knowledge]. 131 Much the same idea appears to be expressed through Pound's
notion of "reason applied to experience.'
132
Aristotle's illustrations provide insight into the operation of practical
intelligence. Explaining that a person who exercises practical intelligence must
have knowledge of both universals and particulars, Aristotle suggests that
"someone who knows that light meats are digestible and healthy, but not which
sorts of meat are light, will not produce health; the one who knows that bird
meats are healthy will be better at producing health.' ' 133 His point is that
knowing universal rules-that it is good to be healthy and that light meats help
to produce health-is not enough; the practically intelligent person must also
know about particulars-that this specific meat, bird meat, falls within the class
of healthy light meats. Consider how closely this illustration parallels Aristotle's
example of the person who strikes another while wearing a ring.1" In that
context, the universal rule holds that wounding with an iron instrument is illegal.
What the judge utilizing practical intelligence realizes, however, is that this
particular iron instrument-a ring-does not fall within the class of iron
instruments the legislature meant the law to address. Hence, the person
wearing a ring who strikes another is not guilty of the law "in reality., 131
Of course, it is true that legislators exercise practical intelligence in the act
of enacting legislation.136 Indeed, Pound admits as much when he argues that
the judicial function runs into the legislative function.'37 The problem is that
while legislators may have sufficient knowledge to lay down universal rules, they
usually do not have sufficient knowledge to allow them to frame laws capable
of dealing with every conceivable case. In this event, according to Aristotle,
"the law chooses the [universal rule] that is usually [correct],' 38 often without
specifying all of the particular cases in which the rule does not apply. Aristotle
suggests two instances in which legislators might promulgate a universal rule
without also codifying all of its exceptions. First, a "point [may] escape[] their
notice. , 139  For example, legislators simply may not envision the particular
case in which a person with an iron ring would strike another and would
therefore technically be guilty of a law penalizing wounding with an iron
instrument. Second, legislators may need to enact a law and yet be "unable to
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Pound, supra note 104, at 734.
133. ETHICS, supra note 7, at VI, 1141b18-21. Readers familiar with Aristotelian ethics will
recognize this as an example of the practical syllogism.
134. See supra text accompanying note 26.
135. RHETORIC, supra note 26, at I, 1374b1.
136. ETHICS, supra note 7, at VI, 1141b24-25 ("One part of practical intelligence about the city is
the ruling part; this is legislative science.").
137. See supra text accompanying note 115.
138. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b15.
139. RHETORIC, supra note 26, at I, 1374a27.
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frame a definition ... for life would be too short for a person who tried to
enumerate the cases."" Indeed, listing all of the particular iron instruments
that the legislature intends to fall into the class of assaultive instruments would
be an endless task. For either of these two reasons-mere oversight or the
practical obstacles to drafting an exact rule-the legislature may enact universal
laws that do not account for the particular facts of individual cases.
When this occurs, Aristotle says the legislator "falls short," and has "made
an error by making an unconditional rule" that does not account for every
particular case.141 Yet, "the law is no less correct on this account, for the
source of the error is not the law or the legislator, but the nature of the object
itself ... 142 Aristotle's point is that universal laws, while necessary, are
nevertheless deficient because they cannot account for every particular case that
might arise under the law. Put another way, general laws are defective precisely
because they provide seemingly universal rules-"light meat is healthy" or
"wounding with an iron instrument is illegal"--often without fully describing the
particular instances in which the rule does or does not hold-"bird meat is light
meat" or "a ring is not an iron instrument for the purposes of this law." Pound
arrives at essentially the same conclusion when he observes that "the very fact
that laws are general rules, based on abstraction and the disregard of the
variable and less material elements in affairs, makes them ... bound in nature
to act mechanically, and not according to the requirements of a particular
case."' 143 In any event, equity, the exercise of practical intelligence in the
judicial context rather than in the legislative context,1" provides the premises
that cannot be supplied at the time of enactment by stating "what the legislator
would have Said himself if he had been present there, and what he would have
prescribed, had he known, in his legislation." 145
Because equity conforms the law to a particular situation by adding missing
premises, it is not surprising that Aristotle contends that "what is equitable is
just, and better than a certain way of being just-not better than what is
unconditionally just, but better than the error resulting from the omission of any
condition [in the rule]."'" In other words, the role of the judge exercising
equity is to decide whether a given case falls within a general legal rule, partly
by considering any implicit conditions the legislature meant to include in the
seemingly unconditional rule. Garrett Barden's expression of this idea is worth
recounting:
The law is universal because it is an understanding and all understanding is universal.
But that understanding which is expressed in law is legally relevant because it is an
140. Id. at 1374a28, 32.
141. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b21-22.
142. Id. at 1137b17-18.
143. Decadence of Equity, supra note 96, at 20.
144. See ETHICS, supra note 7, at VI, 1141b33 (among the parts of practical intelligence are
legislative and judicial parts).
145. Id. at V, 1137b22-24.
146. Id. at 1137b24-25.
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understanding of a usual case. The application of the law to a case always requires the
insight that this case is an instance covered by the law, that is, that this particular case
is a member of the class of usual cases and that, therefore, there is no need to inquire
further. What Aristotle here distinguishes as equitable judgment depends on the
insight that the case is unusual and so must be understood differently!
Under this reading, Aristotle's puzzle regarding the relationship between
equity and justice is easily resolved.14 Indeed, as Aristotle suggests, "[t]he
puzzle arises because what is equitable is just, but is not what is legally just, but
a rectification of it. The reason is that all law is universal, but in some areas no
universal rule can be correct ....,49 That is to say, both equity and legal
justice are parts of justice as a whole and, therefore, both are good. But in any
individual case, equity is "better than"'5 ° legal justice because equity is
exercised by a judge who knows the particular facts of that case, whereas legal
justice-a piece of general legislation-often cannot account for those particular
facts.
Interestingly, despite the fact that Anglo-American jurisprudence usually
conceives of equity as filling gaps in the law,"5' the doctrine of "equitable
interpretation" of statutes is consistent with the view that equity confirms laws
by accounting for particular facts. Rather than conceiving of equity as a device
simply to fill gaps in the law, Anglo-American courts that conduct equitable
interpretation assert that "by looking to the circumstances of the matter under
adjudication [equitable interpretation of statutes] can cure the error that may
result from the universal application of a legal generality., 15 2 Consider again
the case of Riggs v. Palmer.'5' Recall that a boy murdered his grandfather to
obtain his inheritance and that, under the plain meaning of the New York
statutes, the boy would have inherited according to his grandfather's will.
However, the state's highest court refused to enforce the will. The court
observed:
[I]t never could have been [the legislature's] intention that a donee who murdered the
testator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it. If such a case
had been present in their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some
provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for
itr
In Aristotelian terms, the court held that, given the particular facts of the case
at hand, the deficiency of the legislature's general law needed to be rectified by
147. Barden, supra note 42, at 358; see also Shiner, supra note 89, at 1258 ("Judgment about a
particular case in the area of practice is ineluctably particular: It is always necessary for the judge to
determine whether the case is one of the 'many' or one of the exceptions.").
148. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
149. ETHICS, supra note 7 at V, 1137b12-14.
150. Id. at 1137b33-34.
151. See supra part III.B.
152. Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 202 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984), vacated by 702 P.2d 197 (Cal. 1985).
153. 22 N.E. 188 (N. Y. 1889).
154. Id. at 189 (citing a portion of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics).
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the exercise of judicial equity.15  Yet the statutory provision that donees
should inherit according to the terms of the testator's will was no less true
because of the court's holding. As von Leyden aptly puts it, "by making explicit
a qualification intended or understood but not actually expressed in the
formulation of a general rule of law, [equity] confirms rather than abolishes this
rule. 1
5 6
To summarize, under a correct interpretation of Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics, it is misleading to say that equity fills gaps in the law and that it operates
only where there is no adequate law to cover the situation. Instead, equity fills
gaps in the exercise of practical intelligence, which is concerned with particular
facts as well as universal rules. It is, as Pound would say, "reason applied to
experience."' 57  In the context of political affairs, practical intelligence is
utilized in both the legislative and judicial functions. However, what distinguish-
es the use of practical intelligence in the adjudicative context is that a judge
encounters an individual case-a particular set of facts-to which the law must
be applied. Thus, while a legislator must choose the general rule that holds true
in the majority of cases, a judge is presented with a discrete case that requires
consideration of whether the general rule is applicable to the particular
situation.
Under this interpretation, Aristotle's understanding of equity provides
answers to the questions Pound left unaddressed. Consider how reference to
Aristotle's theory fills out each of Pound's steps in the judicial process.
According to Pound, in adjudicating a particular case, a judge must first find
the facts. Aristotle makes clear that this is the step a legislature often cannot
perform in its own exercise of practical intelligence. Excepting ex post facto
laws, the events of a particular case cannot have occurred when a legislature
enacts a law. At best, the legislature can hypothesize about particular situations
that might occur under a law. Hence, a judge's initial responsibility is to discern
the particular facts which in turn act as essential, additional premises for the
application of universal rule to the case at bar.
Second, Pound notes that in deciding a case, a judge must find the applicable
law. Aristotle hints at this idea by maintaining that the knowledge of universals
is essential to the exercise of practical intelligence. That is to say, the exercise
of practical intelligence requires reference to a universal standard-in the
adjudicative context, a law. There simply is no such thing as standardless
equitable decisionmaking to Aristotle. Rather, equity is about the exercise of
155. Judge Jerome Frank recognized a similar idea in Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d
290, 295 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank J., concurring) ("Excessive concentration of attention" on legal rules
sometimes results in "allotting inadequate attention to the interests of the actual parties in the specific
existing cases which it is the duty of courts to decide."). But cf supra notes 68-69 and accompanying
text (Judge Frank asserting that equity only fills gaps in the law).
156. VON LEYDEN, supra note 45, at 97.
157. Pound, supra note 104, at 734.
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practical intelligence, which necessarily involves reference to a universal
standard.
Pound recognizes that finding the appropriate law involves interpreting the
law (or several laws), and he therefore sets out interpretation of law as the third
step in the judicial process. Both Pound and Aristotle acknowledge that
interpretation incorporates a measure of judicial discretion. But Aristotle's
conception of equity is especially helpful in describing what occurs at this point.
He insists that even a simple law such as "wounding with an iron instrument is
illegal" may be subject to unwritten exceptions. Yet these exceptions are not
unlimited; on the contrary, the judge is permitted only to read in "what the
legislator would have said himself if he had been present . . . .",, Simply
stated, a judge's discretion is limited to effectuating the legislative intent, albeit
sometimes a purely conjectural notion of what the legislature would have
intended had it considered the particular facts of the case at hand.
The final step in the judicial process according to Pound is to apply the law
to the individual case. In Aristotle's conception, this is the stage in which
practical intelligence is fully manifested, for here the universal law squarely
meets the particular situation. In the vast majority of cases, application of the
law is straightforward. After using practical intelligence to find the facts of the
case, to find the relevant law, and to interpret the law, a judge merely needs to
follow the dictates of a statute for a case that falls neatly within its boundaries.
In some cases, however, the process of interpreting the law will have resulted
in a law that is not precisely what the prior statute (or case law) set forth,
because the legislature (or other judges) did not draft the law to account for the
particular facts of the case at hand. Had they foreseen those facts and had the
time to draft a rule that would account for this exceptional case, they would
have drafted the law differently. In any event, they would not have intended
the seemingly relevant law to apply to the case. Therefore, the judge must
apply what might appear to be a "new" law to the case, but it is a law that
effectuates the legislative intent. Still, in both the straightforward and more
complicated instances of applying the law, Aristotle's focus remains on a judge's
exercise of practical intelligence, the intellectual virtue consisting of the ability
to combine universal laws with particular facts to arrive at a just result.
D. Equity as the Application of Universal Laws to Particular Cases: A
Reply to the Criticisms of Equity
The preceding interpretation of equity in the works of Aristotle and Pound
avoids the alternating difficulties described in Part IV of this note. First, since
equity acts only to rectify universal rules where they are deficient and not to
replace them, its exercise by judges provides no justification for abolishing the
legislature that promulgates universal rules. Second, since equity involves the
exercise of practical intelligence by a judge with regard to particular cases,
158. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b22-23.
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equity will never disappear, irrespective of the developmental stage of the
general legal code.
Recall the first objection posed in Part IV: If equity, which is "superior" to
legal justice, can fill gaps in the law, there is little reason not to abolish the
legislative task of enacting general rules in favor of wholly individualized
decisions by judges.'59 A proper understanding of the relationship between
practical intelligence and equity demonstrates that this objection is without
merit. The exercise of practical intelligence requires knowledge of both the
universal and the particular. That is to say, the exercise of equitable discretion
presupposes a general standard. "Equity does not repeal the laws," writes
Aaron Kirchenbaum, "[i]t exists side by side with the law, correcting or
supplementing it."'"6  Pound asserts that "[e]ven in the earliest and rudest
justice the will of the judge is not exercised habitually and entirely as such,
wholly free from the constraint of acknowledged rules of action or principles of
decision."' 161 Even as equity accounts for the particular facts of a situation and
applies the law to meet those facts, it does so with reference to a universal
standard. As von Leyden puts it, "a general and authoritative principle of some
sort must be present even in the mind of a personal ruler .... [P]rinciples of
equity are valueless if introduced without 'rhyme and reason', i.e. without a
moral purpose or some general rule."162  Hence, if the equitable judge's
exercise of practical intelligence always involves reference to a universal rule,
the question becomes whether that universal rule should originate in the courts
or the legislature.
Aristotle provides several convincing arguments for holding that the judge
who exercises equity and practical intelligence should refer to universal rules
originating in the legislature rather than in the court. He begins with the
realization that while "treatment is more exactly right when each person gets
special attention," the moral education of an entire population requires
"attention by the community work[ing] through laws."163  Put another way,
while individual attention is theoretically more beneficial to teaching virtue, as
a practical matter, the force of universal law represents the most suitable way
for a city-state to produce the compulsion necessary to encourage virtuous acts.
Additionally, as noted in Part IV, individual rule is subject to corruption
because it is not subject to the moderating influences of collective action."
Finally, Aristotle suggests in the Rhetoric that a judicial decision must be given
"off-hand," making it difficult to "satisfy the demands of justice and expedien-
159. See supra part IV.A.
160. AARON KIRCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES IN LAW 16 (1991).
161. 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 75, at 355.
162. VON LEYDEN, supra note 45, at 95.
163. ETHICS, supra note 7, at X, 1180b11-12, 1180a35.
164. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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cy, '' 165 and that legislated rules are prospective and therefore not "entangled
with likings and hatreds and private interests.' 166
Likewise, Pound realizes that the exercise of equity by judges does not entail
the abolition of general rules enacted by the legislature. In fact, Pound
fervently supports the rule of law. Unlike Aristotle, he fully understands the
importance of the doctrine of separation of powers to twentieth century Anglo-
American law.167 It is inconceivable to him that any legitimate political system
would not vest in its legislature the primary responsibility for laying down rules
and in its courts the duty of applying those rules:
The heavy pressure upon courts today to do what ought to be the work of legislatures
is a hindrance to judicial justice. Attempt to control application of law by minute and
detailed legislation is a mistake. On the other hand, attempt to set up new premises
for legal reasoning on a large scale by judicial lawmaking impairs the stability of the
legal and so for the economic order .... New starts, therefore, are better made by
legislation which has no retroactive application and may be fitted into the system
judicially by experience without unsettling the transactions of the past.'6
Like Aristotle, Pound believes that legislation is superior to personal rule
because it allowed the experiences of a greater number of people to enter the
adjudicative calculus.169  But Pound is a realist. He acknowledges the
impossibility of granting judges no power to individualize their decisions:
It was thought formerly that the ideal of justice according to law was administration
by a perfect system of rules by which either (a) all cases were covered expressly, or (b)
were covered indirectly through rigid deduction or a sort of mathematically exact
development of the logical content of what was expressed. So the ideal was supposed
to be that through this perfect system of rules all cause might be determined with an
absolute certainty of like result in like cases and an absolute assurance that an accurate
prediction of the result might be made if the facts were rightly understood .
Experience has shown that this ideal cannot be realized.70
Instead, argues Pound, Anglo-American law must arrive at a theory that
recognizes equity and discretion "as a legitimate part of the judicial function and
insists that individualization in the application of legal precepts is no less
important than the contents of those precepts themselves." '171 In short, to
Pound as well as Aristotle, equity is not about doing away with general rules.
On the contrary, the exercise of equity consists primarily in the judge's
cognizance of the particular facts that make that case fall inside or outside the
scope of a general rule.
165. RHETORIC, supra note 26, at I, 1354b2.
166. Id. at 1354b8-10.
167. See JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, supra note 100, at 64 ("[Rjecent examples of totalitarian
government show what the separation of powers was devised to save us from and I shall assume that
our administration of justice will continue to be held to conform to it.").
168. Id. at 86-87.
169. 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 76, at 385 ("[T]he rules, principles, and conceptions of the
law formulate the experience of the past in administering justice. No judge can hope to have the
experience which law... makes available to him.").
170. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
171. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100, at 60.
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The second objection to the exercise of equity contended that since equity
simply fills gaps in the law, the realm of the equitable will necessarily diminish
as the legal code develops.'72 Given a proper understanding of equity, this
objection may be quickly and easily dismissed. As Part V of this note
demonstrated, the judicial exercise of equity is rooted in the application of law
to fact. In Paul Vinogradoff's words, equity is the "liberal application of rules
to special sets of circumstances; it forms a link between the general [law] and
the single case in its complicated surroundings."'73  Since adjudication will
always require the application of law to fact, the exercise of equity will remain
regardless of how developed a legal code may become. Indeed, as a statutory
scheme becomes more complicated, the demand for the exercise of equity
actually increases. If one element of equity is to determine whether an
unwritten condition exists in a legal rule, then a judge's duty to rectify "the
error resulting from the omission of any condition"'74 will multiply in propor-
tion to the number of legal rules. Moreover, to the extent that legal rules may
overlap, the equitable judge will be required to exercise practical intelligence
more diligently in order to determine, on the particular facts of each case, which
rule applies. Pound puts the idea clearly, writing that "in no legal system,
however minute and detailed its body of rules, is justice administered wholly by
rule without any recourse to the will of the judge and his personal sense of what
should be done to achieve a just result in the cause before him."' 75 Simply
put, the development of a legal code in no way diminishes-and in an important
sense actually reinforces-the judicial resort to equity.
VI
CONCLUSION
A revised account of the role of equity demonstrates that the dominant
criticisms of equity miss the mark. Equity does not fill gaps in the law. As
such, it does not allow for the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion where a
judge contends that the law does not address the case before the court.17 6
Rather, according to Aristotle and Roscoe Pound, equity is the exercise of
practical intelligence in the judicial context. As Aristotle would put it, equity
allows a judge to rectify the deficiency of a general legal rule that results from
a legislature's inability to consider the facts of a particular case when codifying
a universal law. Or, as Pound would insist, equity is a judge's reason (informed
172. See supra part IV.B.
173. PAUL VINOGRADOFF, II OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 64 (1922).
174. ETHICS, supra note 7, at V, 1137b26.
175. 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 75, at 355; see also PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 100,
at 50 (Attempts to foreclose judicial discretion in finding the applicable law by "minute detailed
legislation have failed signally.").
176. Cf. 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, § 75, at 360 ("This discretion of an Anglo-American court
of equity ... is governed to some extent by principles. It is judicial as distinguished from personal
discretion.").
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by the relevant universal law), applied to experience (the particular facts of the
case at hand).
Hence, equity is not subject to the mere whims of a judge's conscience; it is
limited to effectuating the legislature's purpose. Equity does not undermine the
rule of law; it fulfills universal laws by making plain the unexpressed conditions
and exceptions intended by the lawmaker. And equity will not disappear as the
legal code advances; it will always be a necessary part of selecting the law
applicable to an instant case. In short, equity is not lawless; it allows judges to
act within the confines of the rule of law. As Pound eloquently remarked,
equity may not allow us to achieve the impossible ideal of "a government of
laws and not men," but it does allow us to achieve an equally legitimate
objective, "a government of men acting by law." '177 This vision of equity
provides a sound justification for its exercise in Anglo-American law.
177. JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, supra note 100. at 71.
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